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a b s t r a c t
Boruvka’s algorithm, which computes a minimum cost spanning tree, is used to define a
rule to share the cost among the nodes (agents). We show that this rule coincides with the
folk solution, a very well-known rule of this literature.
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1. Introduction
In this paperwe studyminimumcost spanning tree problems (mcstp). Consider that a group of agents, located at different
geographical places, wants some particular service which can only be provided by a common supplier, called the source.
Agents will be served through connections which entail some cost. However, they do not care whether they are connected
directly or indirectly to the source.
In the literature on mcstp there are several algorithms for constructing minimum cost spanning trees (mt): [6,13,14].
In this paper we focus on Boruvka’s algorithm, which has been studied later by other authors such as Bergantiños and
Vidal-Puga [11,9]. All three are greedy algorithms that run in polynomial time. But constructing an mt is only a part of the
problem. Another important issue is how to allocate the cost associated with themt among the agents. Several authors have
introduced rules inmcstp through some algorithms for constructingmt . The idea is to propose rules to divide the cost among
the agents in a fair way.1
Bird [5], Dutta andKar [10], andBergantiños andVidal-Puga [2] introduce three rules based on Prim’s algorithm. Feltkamp
et al. [12] introduce a rule based on Kruskal’s algorithm. The rules introduced by Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga [2], Feltkamp
et al. [12] coincide [1]. We call this rule the folk solution, which can be obtained in other ways (see [7,8,2–4]).
Nevertheless, as far as we know, no rule has been introduced through Boruvka’s algorithm. We do it. The idea behind
this algorithm is the following. Initially, the network is empty and each agent is a single component. We sequentially add to
the network, for each connected component, the cheapest arc joining this connected component with some agent outside
it and without introducing cycles. We divide the cost of any arc selected by Boruvka’s algorithm following three principles.
First, each agent is assigned to the arc selected by the component he belongs to. Each agent pays, partially, the cost of the
assigned arc. Second, all agents pay the same proportion of the arc assigned. Namely, each agent i pays pca(i) where ca(i) is
the cost of the arc a(i) assigned to agent i. Third, the proportion paid, p, should be as large as possible.
We prove that the rule we introduce coincides with the folk solution.
∗ Corresponding address: Facultade de Ciencias Sociais s/n, Campus A Xunqueira, 36005 Pontevedra, Spain. Fax: +34 986802014.
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1 In this paper we refer to fairness as a general principle to achieve, and not as a well-defined mathematical object.
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the notation. In Section 3, we define our rule and prove the
main result.
2. The minimum cost spanning tree problem
Let N = {1, 2, . . .} be the set of all possible agents. Given N ⊂ N finite, |N| denotes the number of elements in N . We
are interested in networks whose nodes are elements of a set N0 = N ∪ {0}, where N ⊂ N is finite and 0 is a special node
called the source. Usually we take N = {1, . . . , |N|}. A cost matrix C = (cij)i,j∈N0 over N represents the cost of a direct link
between any pair of nodes. We assume that cij = cji ≥ 0 for each i, j ∈ N0 and cii = 0 for each i ∈ N0. Since cij = cji we will
work with undirected arcs and we denote it as {i, j}.
We denote the set of all cost matrices over N as CN . Given C , C ′ ∈ CN , we say C ≤ C ′ if cij ≤ c ′ij for all i, j ∈ N0. We denote
the set of all cost matrices over N with all the costs different asDN , i.e. C ∈ DN if cii′ ≠ cjj′ when {i, i′} ≠ {j, j′}.
Aminimum cost spanning tree problem, brieflymcstp, is a pair (N0, C)whereN ⊂ N is a finite set of agents, 0 is the source,
and C ∈ CN is the cost matrix. A graph g over N0 is a subset of {{i, j} : i, j ∈ N0, i ≠ j}. We define tree, path and connected
component in the usual way. Given an mcstp (N0, C), we denote the mcstp induced by C in S ⊂ N as (S0, C). Given a tree t ,
we denote the restriction of t to nodes in S ⊂ N as tS .
Usually, we denote a tree over N0 as t = {{i0, i}}i∈N where i0 represents the first agent in the unique path in t from i to 0.
We denote the set of trees over N0 as T N0 .
Given an mcstp (N0, C) and a graph g , we define the cost associated with g as c(N0, C, g) = ∑{i,j}∈g cij. When there are
no ambiguities, we write c(g) or c(C, g) instead of c(N0, C, g).
Aminimum cost spanning tree for (N0, C), briefly anmt , is a tree t ∈ T N0 such that c(t) = ming∈T N0 c(g). Since the number
of possible trees is finite, there exists an mt , even though it does not need to be unique. Given an mcstp (N0, C) we denote
bym(N0, C) the cost associated with anymt t in (N0, C).
A (cost allocation)rule is a function f such that for each mcstp (N0, C), we have f (N0, C) ∈ RN and∑i∈N fi(N0, C) =
m(N0, C). As usual, fi(N0, C) represents the cost assigned to agent i.
Feltkamp et al. [12] introduce a rule based on Kruskal’s algorithm. Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga [2] introduce a rule based
on Prim’s algorithm. Bergantiños and Lorenzo-Freire [1] prove that both rules coincide. We call this rule the folk solution
and we denote it as ϕ.
3. A rule based on Boruvka’s algorithm
Boruvka [6] provides an algorithm for computing an mt . We provide a way of sharing the cost of any arc selected by
Boruvka’s algorithm. We first describe Boruvka’s algorithm in a formal way.
Let π be an order over the set of all possible arcs. Namely
π : {{i, j} : i, j ∈ N0, i ≠ j} →

1, 2, . . . ,
|N|
2

.
Boruvka’s Algorithm (associated with the order π ).
Step 1. Let gπ,0 = ∅. Notice that the set of connected components is {{0}, {1}, . . . , {|N|}}.
Assume we have reached Step s (s = 1, 2, . . .) and we have defined gπ,s−1.
Step s. For each connected component T , 0 ∉ T ,2 let {iπ,T , jπ,T } ∈ T × (N0\T ) be the cheapest arc connecting T and N0 \ T .
In case there are more than one possible arc, we select the one with the lowest position in the order π . We then add this arc
to the graph, i.e.
gπ,s = gπ,s−1 ∪ {{iπ,T , jπ,T } : T is a connected component, 0 ∉ T }.
Following this algorithm, gπ,s is a graph with no cycles.
If the set of connected components becomes {N0}, then gπ,s is a tree and the process is over. Otherwise, we move to Step
s+ 1.
The process finishes in a finite number of steps. The tree obtained by this procedure is an mt and we denoted it as tπ .
Moreover, given anmt t , there exists an order π such that tπ = t . It is possible that tπ = tπ ′ , even if π and π ′ are different
orders. For instance, if all the costs are different, tπ = tπ ′ for all π and π ′.
When no confusion arises we write g s, iT , . . . instead of gπ,s, iπ,T , . . . respectively.
We now introduce a rule inmcstp based on Boruvka’s algorithm. At each step, each connected component selects an arc
and each agent is assigned to the arc selected by the component he belongs to. Each agent pays the same proportion, say p,
of the cost of the assigned arc. The proportion pmust be as large as possible.
2 Usually, the condition 0 ∉ T does not appear. We have added it in order to adapt the algorithm to our objective: to divide the cost of themt among the
agents. If 0 ∈ T , then the agents in T do not need to be connected to more agents.
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Letπ be some order of the arcs, let (N0, C) be a costmatrix, and let tπ (or simply t) be the arc selected following Boruvka’s
algorithm associated with π . We now define the rule βπ as follows:
Step 0. We define a0,πi = ∅ for all i ∈ N , p0,π = 0, ϱ0,πij = 0 for all (i, j) ∈ t , A0,π = t , and f 0,πi = 0 for all i ∈ N.
In general, as,πi , or simply a
s
i , denotes the arc in t that agent i pays partially in Step s; p
s,π , or simply ps, denotes the
proportion of the cost of the arc that each agent pays in Step s;ϱs,πij , or simplyϱ
s
ij, denotes the proportion of the cost of arc {i, j}
already paid in Step s; As,π , or simply As, denotes the set of non-completely paid arcs in Step s, i.e. As = {{i, j} ∈ t : ϱsij < 1};
f s,πi , or simply f
s
i , denotes the cost that agent i pays in Step s, i.e. f
s
i = pscasi .
We denote A¯s = t\As = {{i, j} ∈ t : ϱsij = 1}. Let P s be the set of connected components of N0 associated to A¯s.
Assume that we have defined Step r for all r < s. We now define Step s. For simplicity, we omit reference to the order π .
Given a connected component T ∈ P s−1, 0 ∉ T , we select the arc {iT , jT } as in Boruvka’s algorithm, so that {iT , jT } ∈ t .
Moreover, if component T selects {iT , jT } in Step s − 1 and {iT , jT } is not completely paid at the beginning of Step s, then
component T also selects {iT , jT } in Step s.
Given k ∈ T ∈ P s−1, we define ask = {iT , jT }. That is, each agent will pay the cost of the arc selected by Boruvka’s
algorithm for the component he belongs to.
For each arc {i, j} ∈ As−1, let N sij = {k ∈ N : ask = {i, j}} be the set of agents that will pay the cost of arc {i, j}. We define
ps = min

1− ϱs−1ij
|N sij|
: {i, j} ∈ As−1,N sij ≠ ∅

.
Notice that, assuming that all agentsmust pay the same proportion of the cost for each arc, ps is themaximumproportion
that agents can pay in Step s.
For each {i, j} ∈ As−1, we define ϱsij = ϱs−1ij + |N sij|ps. Thus, ϱsij ≤ 1 for each {i, j} ∈ As−1. Moreover, there exists at least
one {i, j} ∈ As−1 such that ϱsij = 1. Thus, As  As−1 and A¯s−1  A¯s. That is, there are more arcs completely paid.
This process finishes when A¯s = t . Since asi ∈ t for each agent i and each Step s, and A¯s−1  A¯s, this process finishes in a
finite number of steps (at most |N|), say γ .
Moreover, by definition the process finishes when
∑γ
s=1 ps = 1.
Definition 3.1. Given an order π of the set of arcs and a cost matrix C, we define Boruvka’s rule induced by the order π as
βπi (N0, C) =
γ−
s=1
f si for each i ∈ N.
We have generated an allocation for each order of the arcs following Boruvka’s algorithm. Even though this allocation
could depend on the order, we prove that it does not (as the rule defined in [12], based on Kruskal’s algorithm). Moreover
we prove that this allocation coincides with the folk solution ϕ. All these statements are proved in the following theorem
(main result).
Theorem 3.1. For each order π , βπ coincides with ϕ.
Proof. The following properties are satisfied by ϕ [2]. We say that a rule f satisfies:
Separability (SEP) if for all (N0, C) and all partition {S, T } of N satisfying m(N0, C) = m(S0, C) + m(T0, C), we have
fi(N0, C) = fi(S0, C) if i ∈ S, and fi(T0, C) if i ∈ T .
Equal Sharing of Extra Costs (ESEC) if for all (N0, C), (N0, C ′) and c0, c ′0 ≥ 0 such that c0i = c0 and c ′0i = c0 for all i ∈ N ,
c0 < c ′0, and cij = c ′ij ≤ c0 for all i, j ∈ N , we have fi(N0, C ′) = fi(N0, C)+ c
′
0−c0
|N| for all i ∈ N .
Continuity (CON) if for all N , f is a continuous function on CN .
Independence of Irrelevant Trees (IIT ) if for all (N0, C) and (N0, C ′) such that they both share a commonmt with the same
costs,3 we have f (N0, C) = f (N0, C ′).
Let π be any order of the arcs in N0, C a cost matrix, and tπ = {{i0, i}}i∈N the mt in (N0, C) obtained through Boruvka’s
algorithm. We will prove that βπ (N0, C) = ϕ(N0, C). We proceed by induction on the number of agents. For |N| = 1, the
result follows from the definition of rule. Assume that the result holds for less than |N| agents.
We first check that it is enough to prove that the result holds for matrices in DN (set of matrices where all costs are
different). Notice that DN is a dense subset of CN . For any C ∈ CN \ DN and tπ the tree obtained through Boruvka’s
algorithm, we can find a sequence of matrices {Cm}∞m=1 ⊂ DN such that (1) Cm → C; (2) tπ is an mt in Cm for all m; (3) if
cii′ = cjj′ and π({i, i′}) < π({j, j′}), then cmii′ < cmjj′ for allm. Under conditions (2) and (3), γ , as,π , ps,π , ϱs,π and As,π coincide
for C and any Cm. Hence, limm→∞ βπ (N0, Cm) = βπ (N0, C). If βπ = ϕ inDN , then the continuity of ϕ implies that the result
is true in all CN .
3 Formally, there exists a tree t that is amt in both (N0, C) and (N0, C ′) and, moreover, cij = c ′ij for all (i, j) ∈ t .
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Hence, we prove the result assuming that C ∈ DN . Then, tπ = tπ ′ and βπ = βπ ′ for any pair of orders π and π ′. Thus, it
is enough to prove that βπ = ϕ for some orderπ . Let π be an order and t = tπ . LetN0 be the set of nodes directly connected
to the source in t and let (j0, j) be the most expensive arc in t . We consider three cases:
Case 1. There are more than one agent directly connected to the source: For any of these agents, say agent i ∈ N0, let F i be
the set of followers of agent i (agents j ∈ N such that {0, i} is in the unique path in t from j to 0) including agent i. Then,
{F i}i∈N0 is a partition of N satisfying that
∑
i∈N0 m(F
i
0, C) = m(N0, C) and tF i0 is a tree in (F
i
0, C) for all i ∈ N0.
Since ϕ satisfies SEP , for all i ∈ N0 and k ∈ F i, we have ϕk(N0, C) = ϕk(F i0, C). We just need to prove βπk (N0, C) =
βπk (F
i
0, C) for all i ∈ N0 and k ∈ F i. Notice that βπk (F i0, C) = ϕk(F i0, C) by the induction hypothesis.
We need to prove that for each i ∈ N0, the cost of the arcs in tF i0 is paid only by the agents in F i. Suppose not. Then, there
exist i ∈ N0 and k ∈ F i such that k selects in step s+ 1 an arc as+1k = {iT , jT } ∈ t \ tF i0 for some T ∈ P s with k ∈ T . Let s be
the first stage in which we can find such i ∈ N0 and k ∈ F i. Thus, the arcs in tT0 have been paid in Step s. By definition, all the
agents in T are connected through arcs in t . Thus, tT0 is a tree in T0. Since in tT0 there are exactly |T | arcs, the cost of the arcs
in tT0 is paid only by the agents in T (s is the first stage in which an agent k ∈ F i is paying an arc outside tF i0 ), and each agent
pays the same proportion pr at each step r , we deduce that
∑s
r=1 pr = 1. This means that the procedure is already finished
in Step s. Hence, there is no Step s+ 1, which is a contradiction.
Case 2. There is exactly one agent directly connected to the source, and it is not player j (hence, the most expensive arc does
not connect to the source): Let F be the set of agents i ∈ N such that arc {j0, j} is in the unique path in t from i to 0. Let
F¯ = N \ F . Notice that F ≠ ∅ and F¯ ≠ ∅ because j ∈ F and j0 ∈ F¯ .
We first prove that agents in F¯ only pay the cost of the arcs in tF¯0 . Suppose not. Then, there exists k ∈ F¯ such that
as+1k = {j0, j} for some step s. Let s be the first stage where this happens. Let T ∈ P s with k ∈ T . Thus, as+1i = {j0, j} for all
i ∈ T . Since cj0j > cii′ for all {i, i′} ∈ tF¯0 and tF¯0 is a tree in F¯0, we deduce that T = F¯ and tF¯0 ⊂ A¯s. Since there are exactly |F¯ |
arcs in tF¯0 , and all the agents pay the same proportion p
r at each Step r , we deduce that
∑s
r=1 pr = 1. This means that the
procedure is already finished in Step s. Hence, there is no Step s+ 1, which is a contradiction.
Similarly, we can prove that agents in F only pay the cost of arcs in tF∪{j0}.
Take the matrix C ′ ∈ DN defined as c ′0j = cj0j, c ′j0j = c0j, and c ′il = cil otherwise. Following the above reasoning,
βπ (N0, C) = βπ (N0, C ′).
Since t is the unique mt in (N0, C), t ′ = (t \ {{j0, j}}) ∪ {(0, j)} is the unique mt in (N0, C ′). Thus, C ′ is in Case 1. Hence,
βπ (N0, C ′) = ϕ(N0, C ′).
Take now the matrix C ′′ ∈ CN defined as c ′′0j = cj0j and c ′′il = cil otherwise. With this change, both t and t ′ are mt in C ′′.
Since ϕ satisfies IIT , ϕ(N0, C ′) = ϕ(N0, C ′′) = ϕ(N0, C).
Case 3. Agent j is the only one directly connected to the source (hence, the most expensive arc connects to the source). Let
{k0, k} ∈ t \ {{0, j}} be the most expensive arc in t \ {{0, j}}. Under our hypothesis, k0 ≠ 0.
We define a new matrix C ′ ∈ CN from C by reducing the cost of the arcs in {(0, i)}i∈N to the same cost as arc (k0, k).
Namely, for each i, l ∈ N , c ′0i = ck0k, and c ′il = cil. Of course C ′ ∉ DN .
We can assume w.l.o.g. that the order π is such that the arcs {{0, i}}i∈N are the last and, among them, {0, j} is the first
one and {0, k} is the second one. Moreover, let π ′ be another order such that the arcs {{0, i}}i∈N come first and, among them,
{0, j} is the first one and {0, k} is the second one.
For any i ∈ N , we prove βπi (N0, C) = ϕi(N0, C) following four equalities.
βπi (N0, C)
Equality 1= βπi (N0, C ′)+
c0j − ck0k
|N|
Equality 2= βπ ′i (N0, C ′)+
c0j − ck0k
|N|
Equality 3= ϕi(N0, C ′)+ c0j − ck0k|N|
Equality 4= ϕi(N0, C).
We now prove the four equalities.
Equality 1. βπi (N0, C) = βπi (N0, C ′)+ c0j−ck0k|N| for all i ∈ N .
When computing βπi (N0, C) and β
π
i (N0, C
′), we realize that (a) their respective mt coincide with t and (b) both
procedures coincide until step γ − 1, where all the arcs in t \ {{0, j}} are completely paid in both procedures and {0, j}
is not paid at all. Thus, f s,πi (N0, C) = f s,πi (N0, C ′) for all i ∈ N and all s < γ . In Step γ , all the players choose arc {0, j}
and hence, the cost of arc {0, j} is shared equally among all agents, i.e. pγ = 1|N| . Thus, for all i ∈ N , f γ ,πi (N0, C) = c0j|N| and
f γ ,πi (N0, C
′) = c
′
0j
|N| . Hence, for all i ∈ N , βπi (N0, C)− βπi (N0, C ′) = c0j|N| −
c′0j
|N| =
c0j−ck0k
|N| .
Equality 2. βπ (N0, C ′) = βπ ′(N0, C ′).
Since the mcstp is the same we omit (N0, C ′) from the notation. Let G be the set of agents i ∈ N such that arc {k0, k} is
in the unique path in t from i to 0. Let G = N \ G. Notice that G ≠ ∅ and G ≠ ∅ because k ∈ G and k0 ∈ G. We prove that
βπi = βπ ′i for all i ∈ G. The case i ∈ G can be proved in a similar way and we omit it.
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We know that tπ = t . Because of the definition of βπ , there exist r1 and r2 such that (a) from Step 1 to Step r1, the agents
in G select arcs in tG, and hence all arcs in tG have been paid completely in Step r1; (b) from Step r1 + 1 to Step r2, all the
agents in G select arc {k0, k}; and hence all the arcs in tG∪{{k0, k}} have been paid completely in Step r2. Hence, as,πi = {0, j}
for all i ∈ N and γ π = r2 + 1.
Because of the definition of π ′, he have tπ ′ = (t \ {{k0, k}})∪ {{0, k}}. Because of the definition of βπ ′ , (a) from Step 1 to
Step r1, the agents in G select arcs in tG, and moreover a
s,π ′
i = as,πi and ps,π = ps,π ′ for all s = 1, . . . , r1 and all i ∈ G, and all
the arcs in tG have been paid completely in Step r1; (b) from Step r1 + 1 to Step γ π ′ , all the agents in G select arc {0, k}.
Let i ∈ G. Then,
βπi =
r1−
s=1
ps,π c ′as,πi
+
r2−
s=r1+1
ps,π c ′as,πi
+ pγ π ,π c ′
aγ
π ,π
i
=
r1−
s=1
ps,π cas,πi +
1− r1−
s=1
ps,π
 ck0k.
Moreover,
βπ
′
i =
r1−
s=1
ps,π
′
c ′
as,π
′
i
+
γ π
′−
s=r1+1
ps,π
′
c ′
as,π
′
i
=
r1−
s=1
ps,π cas,πi +
1− r1−
s=1
ps,π
 ck0k.
Equality 3. βπ ′(N0, C ′) = ϕ(N0, C ′).
The proof is analogous to the proof of Equality 1 and hence we omit it.
Equality 4. ϕi(N0, C) = ϕi(N0, C ′)+ c0j−ck0k|N| for all i ∈ N .
Let C ′′ ∈ CN defined as c ′′0i = c0j and c ′′il = cil for all i, l ∈ N . Since ϕ satisfies ESEC , for all i ∈ N , ϕi(N0, C ′′) =
ϕi(N0, C ′)+ c0j−ck0k|N| . Since t is anmt in (N0, C ′′) and (N0, C) and ϕ satisfies IIT , ϕ(N0, C ′′) = ϕ(N0, C). 
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